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This article considers 2 related themes that address 
population health outcomes and the contributions to those 
outcomes by time, place, individual behaviors and choices, 
and activities of various social sectors. First, what does 
it mean to “produce” population health, and how can the 
production of health be understood empirically? Second, 
through what processes can incentives be modified to 
improve population health? Among the issues that arise 
are understanding the mechanisms through which paying 
for population health works and how the health-producing 
incentives materialize in various sectors, especially those 
whose primary functions are not generally viewed as fos-
tering better population health.
Overview
Population health refers to the distribution of some 
measure of health status across members of a defined 
population at a defined point in time or during a specified 
time. Specific attributes of population health — its mean, 
its across-individual variation, and other attributes — are 
all properties of this underlying distribution of health in a 
population. Of concern here are several questions: How do 
the population health outcomes observed at any place and 
point in time arise? How and why do they vary over time 
and geography? What contributions to population health 
outcomes are made by people’s behaviors and choices? 
And how do the activities of various sectors (producers and 
other institutions, broadly defined) ultimately influence 
population health outcomes?
I consider 2 related themes that address these questions. 
First, what does it mean to “produce” population health, 
and how can the production of health be understood 
empirically? The basic premise is that people respond to 
a variety of incentives and constraints (“opportunities”) to 
make choices that promote or destroy their health. Second, 
because people respond to incentives to engage in health-
enhancing activities, through what processes can incen-
tives be modified to improve population health?
The central issues are understanding the mechanisms 
through which paying for population health (PPH) works 
and how health-producing incentives materialize in vari-
ous sectors, especially those whose primary functions are 
not generally viewed as fostering better population health. 
How multiple sectors affect the health of populations and 
how incentives — financial, regulatory, cultural, psycho-
logical, or others — play a central role in the process is our 
main concern.
Production of Health and Population Health
The Grossman model of health production
Although alternative complementary and competing 
paradigms have been developed, the model developed by 
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Michael Grossman in the early 1970s provides a basis 
for economic analysis of how health outcomes arise (1,2). 
Grossman’s model was based on earlier work on general 
household production by Becker (3). In a simple version 
of the Grossman model, people are viewed as producers 
of health by the choices they make about their behav-
iors and their use of medical care. As an outcome of this 
process, lifetimes are more or less “healthy.” People are 
constrained in their opportunities to produce health for 
various reasons: financial constraints, time constraints, 
baseline endowments of physical and mental health 
(known as health capital in the Grossman model), and the 
social and natural environments and contexts they occupy. 
Moreover, people may differentially weigh being healthy 
relative to other things and, consequently, may be more or 
less motivated to invest in their health even if confronted 
with the same opportunities to produce health.
The analytical framework that arises from this para-
digm involves 2 main concepts: health production func-




where x represents choices, health capital, and social and 
environmental factors, and p represents constraints and 
incentives, health capital, preferences, and social and envi-
ronmental factors. The literature refers to h = f1(x) as the 
“structural” health production function and to h = f3(p) as 
the “reduced form” health production function. Therefore, h 
= f3(p) indirectly. Determining the shape of health produc-
tion functions is ultimately an empiric matter.
Within a population, people generally differ in the 
constraints and incentives (“opportunity sets”) they face 
(except that everyone has 1,440 minutes of time to spend 
each day), in the baseline levels of health capital possessed, 
in the values placed on healthiness versus other desirable 
ends, and in their capabilities to produce health via par-
ticular choices. This framework also emphasizes that the 
heterogeneous environments (eg, social, natural, cultural) 
that people occupy may influence health directly, as well 
as influence the choices that are made. Because of all these 
differences among people, the Grossman model inherently 
predicts that the healthiness within the population will 
vary and, thus, likely differ across populations. Virtually 
all of the empiric work that has been pursued in this field 
has been based on some variant of the Grossman model’s 
conceptual framework.
Given the scope of this essay, it is not possible to elabo-
rate on all the aspects of this paradigm. Three features, 
however, are noteworthy. First, the use of medical care 
is just one of many choices people make to invest in their 
health; to varying degrees, constraints such as health 
insurance, genetic predispositions, the value of time, and 
other factors affect choices made to use medical care. 
Debates about the productivity of medical care can in 
principle be undertaken in this conceptual framework. 
Second, the role of schooling in this framework has been 
debated extensively; better schooling correlates positively 
and strongly with better health, but the extent to which 
schooling (however measured) causes better health out-
comes is not well understood (4). Third, health status is 
multidimensional, and various choices may differentially 
influence different aspects of health; some choices (eg, 
exercise) may influence positively a range of aspects of 
health, while others (eg, prescription drug use) may con-
tribute positively to some aspects but negatively to others 
(eg, via adverse side effects).
Empiric considerations
To be useful in forming policies and interventions, 
the Grossman model’s conceptual framework must be 
supported by data. Unfortunately, there are nontrivial 
empiric impediments to understanding the parameters 
of the Grossman model, which is a reason why the health 
production function has been termed a fantasy equation 
(5). Significant progress has been made in the empiric 
understanding of health production relationships dating 
back to the first serious empiric work in the field (6); how-
ever, the limitations of using this analytical framework 
are as notable as the successes. Some of these empiric 
impediments include the following:
1. The availability of individual-level data on health, 
health-producing behaviors, and related phenome-
na has grown substantially in the 40 years since 
Grossman’s original work was undertaken. However, 
the usefulness of such data has not grown commen-
surately. Whether the data are from government 
records or from health care administrative records, 
confidentiality regulations or other logistical issues 
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often preclude linking these data to information 
on constraints, incentives, and environments faced 
by people. Without such information, the statistical 
obstacles to understanding relationships that produce 
population health will be formidable.
2. Data on aggregates of people are less constrained by 
confidentiality considerations, but there are limits on 
what can be learned from studying data obtained at 
aggregate levels because of ecologic fallacy (drawing 
inferences about people on the basis of empiric analysis 
that uses aggregate data) and related considerations. 
There is considerable population heterogeneity in the 
opportunity sets that people face, the social and envi-
ronmental contexts that they occupy, and their prefer-
ences for health and other valued outcomes. Relying 
on aggregates of data (eg, geographic aggregates like 
census tracts or counties) could obscure potentially 
important within-aggregate heterogeneity.
3. Although considerable information is available on the 
health-related choices made by people, the Grossman 
model forces the recognition that such behaviors are 
self-selected (eg, because of differences in preferences 
across a population) rather than exogenously or ran-
domly assigned. Consequently, simple regressions 
of health outcomes on health-related choices do not 
reveal the causal mechanisms fundamental to the 
Grossman framework. To circumvent such consider-
ations of self-selection, it may be more instructive in 
some cases for policy making to directly relate health 
outcomes and opportunity sets (eg, by estimating the 
reduced-form health production function described 
above), thus avoiding or mitigating some of the con-
cerns about self-selection. For instance, although it 
may be interesting to understand the causal relation-
ship between milk consumption and various health 
outcomes, it might also be interesting to know — and 
may be easier to learn — whether dairy support or 
policies for vitamin D fortification affect health, albeit 
indirectly. Yet the obstacles identified above often pre-
clude the linkage of suitable data on the opportunity 
set measures to personal data on health outcomes and 
other characteristics.
4. Even if these issues were resolved, there remain fun-
damental measurement issues. One issue is to recon-
cile the ideal conceptual measures of personal health 
with those available in our data. Another is how to 
summarize a heterogeneous distribution of health in a 
population in order to quantify “population health” in 
any particular instance.
Producers and Institutions in the 
Production of Population Health
Incentives and the production of health across sectors
The production of population health arises from the 
activities of population members producing health at 
the personal level, albeit influenced by and involved in 
social and natural environments in which such productive 
behaviors may be undertaken and interact socially. In this 
paradigm, “sectors” only “produce” health to the extent 
that their actions shape a person’s social and environmen-
tal contexts: “sectors” don’t produce health, people do.
If this personal health production paradigm is accepted, 
then what specific empiric meaning should be given to the 
notion of the “multisector production of health”? Without 
abandoning this term — it is useful to the extent that it 
has served to draw attention away from the health care 
sector, per se, as the “sector” from which population health 
outcomes arise — what specific interpretation can be given 
that is consistent with the personal-based model of the 
production of health? Instead of conceiving sectors as “pro-
ducers” of population health outcomes, these different sec-
tors and their activities ought to be viewed as promoters 
or inhibitors of improved population health outcomes. This 
seems reasonable to the extent that the policies and activi-
ties in which they engage establish incentives or disincen-
tives that influence a person’s choice of health-producing 
inputs (ie, affect a person’s time, money, and other factors 
that define their opportunity sets). Consequently, PPH 
means deploying resources to create incentives. In essence, 
this framework provides economic and social actors with 
self-serving reasons to change the way business is done so 
that those clients affected within their spheres of activity 
might come to face new and (presumably) stronger incen-
tives to make healthier choices.
The textbook version of this approach is an economy that 
produces “guns and butter” and that is constrained in the 
quantities of these commodities that can be produced by 
the quantities of resources (eg, labor, materials) available 
at any time in that economy. In this instance, however, 
“health” and “X” substitute for guns and butter as the 2 
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outputs of our sector, and the “health” outputs arise indi-
rectly via the health-producing activities of the clients of 
this sector. For example, the activities of the K-12 educa-
tion sector influence clients’ health production activities 
but also affect, for example, their math and reading scores 
and college acceptance rates.
In this 2-commodity world, the mix of “health” and “X” 
that actually emerges is dictated by the incentives pro-
ducers have to channel productive resources into these 
activities. In general, market or political forces or both 
will determine these incentives, but we recognize that 
policy interventions such as PPH can modify the nature 
and magnitude of the incentives that would be determined 
by market forces on their own (eg, agricultural policy, in 
the form of higher price subsidies or supports, would be 
expected to sway the production balance more toward 
butter). For instance, in the absence of a PPH strategy, 
the sector in question may have little or no incentive to 
provide incentives for its clients to produce health. A suc-
cessful PPH strategy modifies the incentives facing this 
sector, resulting in an outcome that implies more “health” 
at the necessary cost of less “X.” The practical issue is how 
incentives can be most cost-effectively provided to the vari-
ous sectors, so that those sectors in turn provide incentives 
to their respective clients.
Examples
Consider the range of activities in which K-12 policy 
makers engage that have potential implications for the 
health-producing activities of their clients. Considering 
the budgetary constraints and regulatory environments 
they face, K-12 school boards and administrators enact 
policies to achieve outcomes across a range of objectives 
(eg, test scores, dropout rates, vending machine and cafe-
teria offerings, foreign language classes, athletic team per-
formance). The activities that contribute to these outcomes 
entail various incentives and disincentives for students to 
make health-producing choices. In the PPH context, pay-
ing for better population health outcomes via activity in 
the K-12 sector entails using financial and political muscle 
to change the importance that school boards and admin-
istrators attach to the outcomes they produce (eg, more 
focus on physical education, less on after-school clubs) and 
the regulatory environments in which they operate (eg, 
bans on soft drink machines, sponsorships). Over time 
the investments in after-school clubs could culminate in 
enhanced levels of human capital of the participants which 
in turn could enhance health-producing activities in the 
adult years.
These same principles apply in more specific contexts, 
and are illuminating when considering how various “sec-
tors” of the economy (private and public) may be provided 
incentives via PPH strategies to engage in activities that 
result in incentives for people to engage in healthier 
behaviors. Transportation departments can invest more 
in highway beautification or in road safety; environmental 
and natural resource agencies can invest more in protect-
ing endangered species or in preventing contamination of 
air and water; businesses can invest more in decorative art 
or in workplace wellness and fitness programs. The moti-
vations for such differential investment strategies arise 
from the manner in which the various PPH strategies are 
implemented.
Two considerations are noteworthy. First, there are 
tradeoffs because of the ultimate scarcity of productive 
resources, at least in the short run; more production of 
health comes at a cost of less production of “X.” Second, the 
mix of “health” and “X” produced does not arise randomly 
but rather by purposive choices made in the existing incen-
tive structures by the people who are the clients of the sec-
tors in question. Understanding how PPH strategies can 
modify existing incentive structures that are established 
implicitly or explicitly by the respective sectors — as well 
as the social and economic contexts that influence health 
that are under the purview of these sectors — is essential 
if the PPH approach is to be successful.
Summary
Incentives matter. People make health-producing choic-
es in light of the opportunity sets they face. Public and 
private sector institutions directly or indirectly establish 
incentives for people to be more or less healthy because of 
the incentives they themselves face. Consequently, PPH 
ultimately implies that financial, political, regulatory, and 
other resources must be deployed strategically to change 
the incentive structures to which people and institutions 
respond in their day-to-day activities. Considerations of 
the practicalities of how such incentive structures can be 
modified — and recognition of the tradeoffs that may be 
entailed in effecting such modifications — ought to be near 
or at the top of the PPH research agenda.
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